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INTRODUCTION
Please let me begin by expressing my great appreciation for being
invited to participate on this panel. Any topic selected by Professor Bruce
Green will be dynamic, timely, and perhaps just a little bit
controversial—but never dull. Since Bruce picked the panelists as well, I
will do my best to enlighten and entertain. We are here today to examine
“the contemporary role, conduct, challenges, and responsibilities of
judges in criminal cases.” I have not been on the scene for quite as long
as Bruce, but I would like to discuss three trends I have noticed over the
last three decades during which I have practiced and studied criminal law.
The most recent trend has the potential to greatly expand the discretionary
authority of federal district judges by the issuance of national injunctions;
an earlier movement that largely, but not completely, reduced judicial
authority over criminal trials and sentences, and the earliest inherent
judicial control over courtroom behavior remains mostly unchanged. I
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas. SEALS Conference, Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, August 7, 2018. Thanks to UT law students Chloe Teeter, Sarah Fernandez,
and Celia Villarreal and librarian Matt Steinke for their helpful research assistance, to the
participants in the SEALS panel on judging for their useful comments on the earlier draft of this
Essay presented at the conference, and finally to Professor Bruce Green for his written comments.
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will discuss these trends in reverse order.
From my vantage point, judges’ individual control over their
courtrooms remains largely stable. Updated but similar versions of the
problems encountered (and created) by Judge Julius Hoffman now
confront our newer, younger, and more qualified judges. 1 While federal
judges may be less likely to encounter radical, overtly political
defendants and government officials trying to wrest control (and public
opinion) from them in court, they are more likely to see minority
defendants along with accompanying “courtwatchers” who want
inequities in the criminal justice system noticed in individual cases. I will
first describe the Chicago Eight (soon to become the Chicago Seven) trial
and then explain the new courtwatchers in Part I.
On the other hand, I have witnessed federal judges having lost,
primarily since the mid-1980s, much of their earlier control over the
criminal justice process in general, but in particular over charging and
sentencing decisions. Judicial discretion and control over a criminal trial
is obviously less important when 97.2 percent of federal felony sentences
are imposed by the district judge pursuant to a guilty plea negotiated
between the government and the defendant, and only 2.8 percent of the
sentences that judges impose are after a jury or bench trial.2 The power
players in the criminal justice system are the folks who determine
whether to offer a plea and what plea terms to include. We live in a world
of guilty pleas controlled by prosecutors. Federal prosecutors determine
whom to investigate, whom to charge, and how much punishment to
impose.3 However, the pendulum has begun to swing back, and federal
district judge discretion over criminal sentencing is now on the rise. I will
support these observations, as well as offer some good sentencing news
post-Booker,4 in Part II.
1. Judge Julius Hoffman, the federal district judge who tried the Chicago Seven, was rated
“unqualified by 78 percent of the lawyers polled in a 1976 survey of judicial performance by the
Chicago Council of Lawyers.” Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lessons of the ‘60s: “We’d Do It Again,”
Say the Chicago Seven’s Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 32, 33.
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS S-25 fig.C
(2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2017/2017SB_Full.pdf [hereinafter USSC SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK]
(the above statistics include only those defendants found guilty by juries or who admitted guilt,
excluding those defendants who obtained a dismissal or an acquittal).
3. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 1279–1370 (6th ed. 2015) (exploring plea bargaining and
cooperation agreements in the context of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Constitution).
4. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as is, but could be saved by excising 18 U.S.C.
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Finally, in Part III, I will raise a relatively new phenomenon—federal
district court judges imposing nationwide temporary restraining orders
against the federal government. Though this last trend is not limited to or
primarily about criminal trials, I think it fairly covered by the topic for
today—most of these injunctions involve controversial policies that can,
like with the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals case,5 lead to
criminal charges. This legal device allows a single federal judge in a
single judicial district to determine federal policy for the entire country,
at least until the matter can be resolved by the Supreme Court. This is one
of the few areas where I have seen federal district judicial authority
expand over the last few decades. The Supreme Court has taken very
recent notice of this trend,6 and will likely have something to say about
the matter soon.
I. FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN THE TUMULTUOUS 1960S VERSUS
THE NEW AGE OF “COURTWATCHERS” AND OTHER MODERN-DAY
PROTESTORS
When I was initially invited to this panel, I embarrassingly admitted
that I knew next to nothing about this infamous trial, despite the fact that
I was hired at the University of Texas by the great Michael Tigar. When
I met Michael, he was a staid law professor, but in the 1960s he was one
of the prominent defense attorneys thrown into federal lockup in Chicago
by a U.S. Marshal when Judge Hoffman tried to strong-arm defendant
Bobby Seale into replacing his attorney, Charles R. Garry, with substitute
counsel.7 Those of us who ignore history are doomed to repeat it, so it
was clearly the time for a quick study. I discovered that the Chicago
Seven (at that time there were actually eight defendants) were a group of
political activists who were arrested for anti-war rioting, conspiracy, and
alleged illegal activities during the August 1968 Democratic National
Convention in Chicago, Illinois.8 Numerous “radical” groups converged

§ 3553(b)(1), which required the court to sentence within range, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which
required de novo review of sentencing errors for conformity with the guidelines).
5. See infra note 130.
6. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
7. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 33. Judge Hoffman demonstrated hostility toward the defense from
the get-go, when he refused to delay the trial so that Mr. Seale’s lawyer, who needed emergency
surgery, could attend. Id.
8. Chicago Seven, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/ChicagoSeven-law-case (last visited June 8, 2019) [hereinafter Chicago Seven, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA]; see generally JACOB EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL: AN ESSAY ON
LAW, LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1970); Conspiracy: The Trial of the Chicago 8 (HBO
television broadcast May 16, 1987).
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in Chicago to protest U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, as well as
other government policies considered racist. Eight protest leaders: Abbie
Hoffman and Jerry Rubin (Youth International Party or “Yippee”); Tom
Hayden (cofounder, Students for a Democratic Society or “SDS”); Bobby
Seale (Chairman, Black Panther Party); David Dellinger and Rennie
Davis (National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam or
“MOBE”); and John Froines and Lee Weiner, were arrested along with
hundreds of others on charges of criminal conspiracy and incitement to
riot.9 Rioting and violence had erupted sporadically between August 25th
and August 29th as Chicago police, armed with tear gas and billy clubs,
attempted to enforce an 11:00 p.m. curfew in the city’s parks where the
young protesters were camping.10
The trial was conducted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois and lasted an amazing five months (from September
24, 1969 to February 18, 1970). Observers noticed pretty immediately
that Judge Julius Hoffman appeared biased in favor of the government.11
Though Tom Hayden hoped to win his trial by playing it straight,
defendants Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin treated the proceeding as a
farce: eating jelly beans, making faces and blowing kisses, wearing
outlandish clothing, cracking jokes, and otherwise deliberately disrupting
the trial. Their conduct was later termed “Guerilla Theater” for the way
it commanded media attention.12 The nadir of the trial was when Judge
Hoffman had codefendant Bobby Seale, the only black defendant in the
group, bound and gagged for three days in front of the jury for allegedly
calling him a “fascist dog,” a “pig,” and a “racist.”13 A mistrial was
declared as to Mr. Seale, and he was removed from the criminal trial a
month after it began.14 Though the government eventually dismissed its

9. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1974) (mem.). The 1968 federal Anti-Riot Act was codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2101.
10. The 1968 Walker Report, a study prepared under the direction of Chicago attorney Daniel
Walker for the U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, concluded
that a “police riot” had sparked the violence. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 33. Americans watched the
police respond to the young demonstrators “with an orgy of head bashing” on television. Id. at 32.
11. Chicago Seven, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 8. As a reporter for the New York
Times noted, Judge Hoffman presided over “a kangaroo court in which an arrogant despot favored
the prosecution at every turn and could barely conceal his contempt for the defendants’ lifestyles
and politics.” Goldberg, supra note 1, at 33. According to David Goldberger, at the time the legal
director for the Chicago chapter of the ACLU, “Hoffman was one of the worst judges who ever sat
on the federal bench . . . . He was a bully who loved to put down lawyers.” Id.
12. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 32 (calling it “the hottest show in town”).
13. Chicago Seven, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 8.
14. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1972).
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criminal case against Seale,15 Judge Hoffman was less forgiving, and,
acting pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Mr. Seale was summarily tried individually for contempt of court, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), and was sentenced to four years in
prison.16 The remaining seven defendants (now the “Chicago Seven”)
were acquitted of conspiracy, but five of them were convicted of crossing
state boundaries with the intent to induce a riot. 17 Judge Hoffman
sentenced each of the five defendants that the jury found guilty to five
years in prison, and moreover summarily sentenced all seven defendants
(even the two acquitted) plus two of their attorneys (William Kunstler
and Leonard Weinglass) to prison terms for contempt of court!18
The substantive criminal convictions against the Chicago Seven were
all reversed on appeal.19 In overturning these convictions, Judge Fairchild
cited Judge Hoffman’s “deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude
toward the defense” during the almost five months of trial as a primary
reason for the reversal.20 Cumulatively, Judge Hoffman’s comments
“must have telegraphed to the jury the judge’s contempt for the
defense.”21 The Seventh Circuit panel also noted Judge Hoffman’s failure
to conduct pertinent voir dire regarding the jurors’ exposure to pretrial
publicity and their attitudes toward the Vietnam War, and his abuse of
discretion on rejecting expert witnesses.22 The government never refiled
any of the charges against the Chicago Seven, nor did the government
ever attempt to charge Mr. Seale with the original substantive federal
crimes after his mistrial.
Moreover, in addition to the eventual failure of the substantive
criminal trials, both sets of these contempt convictions that Judge
Hoffman imposed were reversed on appeal in two companion cases
15. Id. at 350 n.3.
16. Id. at 350–51 (reversing contempt convictions imposed by Judge Hoffman). An appendix
to the Seventh Circuit ruling contains the Certificate of Contempt filed by Judge Julius J. Hoffman
against Mr. Seale, dated November 5, 1969. Id. at 373–89. See generally Chicago Seven,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 8 (describing the contempt charges).
17. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1972).
19. In re Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 416 (Pell, J., concurring in part).
20. Id. at 385–86 (majority opinoin) (noting “[t]rial decorum often fell victim to dramatic and
emotionally inflammatory episodes,” complaints about discrimination in seating arrangements, the
chilling effect of placing nineteen marshals in the courtroom, etc.).
21. Id. at 387.
22. Id. at 368–69 (failure to inquire as to juror prejudices regarding war in Vietnam); id. at 371–
77 (failure to inquire about jurors’ exposure to pretrial publicity); id. at 385–87 (erroneous rejection
of expert witnesses in areas of racism, youth culture, and police crowd control); id. at 388. See also
Chicago Seven, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 8.

938

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

rendered in 1972.23 In In re Dellinger,24 the contempt appeal for the
Chicago Seven and their two attorneys, Judge Cummins reversed all
contempt counts against the seven defendants in light of Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania.25 The Mayberry Court held that where a trial judge is the
object of personal vilification carrying potential for bias and he does not
act instantly to cite for contempt, due process forbids him from sitting in
judgment on the alleged contemnor.26 The defendant is entitled to a
hearing before a judge other than the one he has reviled.27 The Dellinger
panel rejected the government’s argument that post-trial summary
contempt punishments of the two lawyers in the case was proper under
earlier Court holdings, finding instead that the more recent Mayberry case
forbade the use of summary contempt power post-trial by a trial judge
who had become “personally embroiled” with the lawyers cited.28 In both
Dellinger and its companion case, United States v. Seale, the Seventh
Circuit provided, as additional grounds for reversal, that the defendants
were entitled to a trial by jury on the contempt charges. 29 The contempt
counts were punishable by prison sentences that exceeded six months and
thus required a jury trial, and Judge Hoffman could not avoid this
requirement by indicting numerous instances of contempt that each
carried a six-month sentence. “[T]he potential for abuse is obvious.”30
As already noted, the government decided not to refile the original
criminal charges against the Chicago Seven31 or against Mr. Seale.32 The
23. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 345 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing contempt citations
against Mr. Seale in part because Judge Hoffman should have recused himself from the contempt
hearings because of his personal relationship with the defendants and because defendants were
entitled to a trial by jury on the contempt charges). Four of the sixteen contempt charges were
reversed as insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 371. See also In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389
(reversing contempt citations against the Chicago Seven and their two attorneys).
24. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389.
25. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
26. Id. at 463–66.
27. Id.
28. The government had relied upon Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (holding that
this particular judge was so “personally embroiled” with a lawyer at the trial as to make him unfit
to sit in judgment on the contempt charge), and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (holding
that remarks of a witness at a state criminal trial that he was being “badgered” and “coerced” did
not constitute such a personal attack on the judge so as to require his disqualification from pending
post-trial contempt hearing). The Dellinger court also noted Justice Jackson’s statement in Sacher
v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), that it is realistically impossible to distinguish between
personally insulting contempt and those which are not personal affronts, and in consequence there
should be disqualification in every case of delayed citation. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 394 n.5.
29 . United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. Id.
31. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
32. Seale, 461 F.2d at 351 n.3.
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contempt charges against Mr. Seale were dropped when a court
compelled the government to produce transcripts of illegal wiretapping.33
The contempt charges against the Chicago Seven and their attorney Mr.
Kunstler were refiled and retried in a bench trial before a federal judge
from Maine named Edward Gignoux.34 He acquitted five of the
defendants and upheld contempt findings only against attorney Kunstler
and defendants Dellinger, Hoffman, and Rubin, though no fines or prison
sentences were imposed.35
I will focus on two key issues surrounding the 1969 trial, which will
transition us to the same issues facing current district judges: (1) were the
original criminal charges politically motivated?; and (2) did Judge
Hoffman’s treatment of Mr. Seale transform the proceeding into a
political trial? In my opinion, while the answer to the first question is not
as clear (though I lean towards an affirmative answer), the answer to the
second is a resounding “yes.” Of course both questions depend heavily
upon the meaning assigned to the term “political.” There are many
plausible definitions we could ascribe to the word “political” in this
context.
First, we might call the trial “political” if the opposing major political
party would not have brought such charges in an identical scenario. (So,
in this case, for example, it was political if only the Republicans would
have instituted the Chicago Seven trial, and had the Democrats been in
power, the case would not have been indicted.) Second, we could call a
prosecution “political” if the prosecution is pursued only because of the
identity of the defendants, or because of the causes such defendants
represent, or because the underlying alleged crime was committed or
defended to make a political point or advance a political agenda. (So, for
example, less famous lawyers and individuals who were not social and
political players would not have been charged, and in fact were not
charged, for identical conduct.) This is close to the definition offered by
Professor Zalman, who defined a “political crime” as “the application of
33. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 35.
34. “The Chief Justice of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1976), then designated
the Honorable Edward T. Gignoux, District Judge of the United States District Court for the District
of Maine, to hear the contempt specifications on remand.” United States v. Dellinger, 657 F.2d 140,
141–42 (7th Cir. 1981).
35. In re Dellinger, 357 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, aff’d,
502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975). The case was reopened when
defendants sought to expunge the contempt findings on the basis of law enforcement and
prosecutorial misconduct, after they obtained documents through a FOIA request showing that
police had monitored meetings between the defendants and their counsel during trial. Judge
Gignoux, while calling the government surveillance program “particularly egregious,” upheld the
contempt convictions. Dellinger, 657 F.2d at 146 n.15.
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criminal law to politically dissident factions.”36 Or third, we might define
a “political” charge much more broadly as any offense where a
substantial percentage of the population disagrees with the law being
enforced (as was true during Prohibition for crimes involving alcohol,
and is true today in many states for federal anti-marijuana enforcement).
I will refrain from selecting a definition for now, and I will return to it
when I discuss courtwatching later in this section.
This prosecution was arguably “political” under either of our first two
definitions. The eight activists were indicted on charges of violating and
conspiring to violate the Anti-Riot Act of 1968.37 Ramsey Clark, the
outgoing attorney general under Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson, had
recommended no prosecution of what was then the Chicago Eight
because a grand jury refused to indict after three months. However,
ingoing Attorney General John Mitchell, appointed by new President
Richard Nixon, immediately sought an indictment in the case.38 A couple
of days after the Chicago Eight were indicted, President Nixon began to
denounce student rebellions and ring the law-and-order bell. In one
speech a few months after the indictment, the president warned, “Drugs,
crime, campus revolts, racial discord, draft resistance—on every hand we
find old standards violated, old values discarded.”39 Then the Department
of Justice announced that it was conducing electronic surveillance of the
defendants without a court order due to national security threats.40 Both
36. Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The Need for Criminal Law
Theory, 20 VILL. L. REV. 897, 897–98 (1975). In Professor Zalman’s view, “political crime is
restricted to offenses affecting sovereignty, national security or governmental functions,” such as
treason and sedition. Id. at 899.
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012). This was passed after the violence in Newark following
the assassination of Martin Luther King. It made crossing state lines with intent to incite a riot a
federal felony punishable by five years’ imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.
38. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 34.
39. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSIONS 36–37 (1975); Pnina Lahav, The Chicago
Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2000).
This quote is from Nixon’s speech at General Beadle State College on June 3, 1969, contained in
the Public Papers of the President of the United States archives, located at the Federal Depository
Library. The full text of the speech and the quote in the text can be found at: President Richard
Nixon, Address at the Dedication of the Karl E. Mundt Library at General Beadle State College,
Madison, South Dakota (June 3, 1969), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-thededication-the-karl-e-mundt-library-general-beadle-state-college-madison-south.
40. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 108–13; BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, THE CHICAGO
SEVEN: 1960S RADICALISM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/
sites/default/files/trials/chicago7.pdf; Lahav, supra note 39, at 1331. The Seventh Circuit did not
address the argument that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C. § 2511(3)) permitted electronic surveillance without a warrant in “an ‘emergency
situation’ . . . with respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest.” See
United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 365 (7th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court later invalidated the
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of these government actions appear to frame the Chicago Seven trial as a
crackdown on the protest movements. So, if we accept our first definition
of “political”—that the opposition party would not have charged the
offense; then perhaps we can label the trial “political.” If we accept the
second definition—requiring that other less famous or expressive
individuals would not have been charged, and that this prosecution was a
“symbolic” stand for “American values”—then again this prosecution
might be labeled “political.”41
After all, in reversing substantive criminal convictions, the appellate
court itself noted “the conflicts of values represented by the so-called
youth culture—hippies, yippies and freaks—in contrast with the more
traditional values of the vast majority of the community, presumably
including most citizens summoned for jury service.”42
[W]e are not unaware that many otherwise qualified members of the
community could not be impartial toward, and in fact are often offended
by, persons who wear long hair, beards, and bizarre clothing and who
seem to avoid the burdens and responsibilities of regular employment.
Several defendants would exemplify this conflict.43

Recall that the anti-riot law itself had just been enacted and then
immediately attacked as facially unconstitutional, so if nothing else, the
Chicago Seven were the guinea pigs to test this new law. During the grand
jury phase of their investigation, the individuals who would later come to
be known as the Chicago Seven defendants instituted a class action for
themselves and others that sought a declaratory judgment that the 1968
Civil Disorders and Riot provisions of the criminal code (18 U.S.C. §§
231, 232, 2101, and 2102) were unconstitutional on their face and as
applied.44 The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument in 196945 and again
when it eventually reversed their convictions in 1972. 46 Yet despite its
DOJ’s rationale. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kieth), 407 U.S. 297, 306 (1972).
41. See RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA
59–65, 70 (1970); Zalman, supra note 36, at 913–15.
42. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 369 (7th Cir. 1972).
43. Id.
44. The defendants unsuccessfully sought to enjoin their indictment on the grounds that the
statute was unconstitutional on its face. The district court rejected that argument, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed in National Mobilization Committee to End The War in Viet Nam v. Foran, 411
F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1120–21 (5th Cir.
1972) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 231(a), another civil unrest law enacted with the
Anti-Riot Act that prohibited teaching use of and/or making explosives, based upon intent
requirement).
45. Foran, 411 F.2d at 938.
46. In the case reversing the Chicago Seven’s convictions, the Seventh Circuit again held that
the Anti-Riot act was not facially unconstitutional. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 409. But see id. (Pell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the statute is facially unconstitutional and inconsistent with the First
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“facial” constitutionality, the government ultimately lost the Chicago
Seven trial and rarely tried such a tack again.
18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 2101, and 2102 were part of a compromise
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968.47 The enactment of Sections
2101 and 2102 is commonly referred to as the Federal Anti-Riot Act of
1968 (although this popular name of the act does not appear in the text of
the law). Liberals in Congress in the late 1960s thought the most effective
solution to civil disorder in urban cities was an attack on the root causes
such as substandard housing, poverty, unemployment, and racial
discrimination. Conservatives believed that the recent riots were caused
by organizations not necessarily concerned with the well-being of the
rioters, and that therefore the rioting should be squelched by harsh
criminal penalties.48 Professor Zalman believed this Federal Anti-Riot
Act was a symbolic measure so that Congress could claim it was properly
reacting to the riots after the April 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., and that Congress was well aware that its effective parts
were redundant with existing and adequate federal and state laws.49
I could find less than a handful of prosecutions using 18 U.S.C. § 2101
outside of the Chicago Seven trial. There was one 1969 case in California
upholding the constitutionality of the statute,50 one in Rhode Island
excluding an act from the statute’s coverage,51 one in Oregon that had
been dismissed in the best interests of justice,52 and one case involving

Amendment).
47. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (providing a compromise amendment
to the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
48. Zalman, supra note 36, at 911.
49. Id. at 912–13.
50. In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff’d sub nom. Carter v. United States, 417
F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2101 and compelling
witnesses granted immunity to answer questions before a grand jury), cert denied, 399 U.S. 935
(1970). The crux of these cases was whether the immunized witnesses had to answer questions
before a grand jury, not the constitutionality of Section 2101.
51. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 492 F.2d 979 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming that three
inmates secretly starting a fire causing damage and prisoner relocation did not meet any of the three
definitions of riot in a reinsurance contract, rejecting the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2101 is
inconsistent with the riot definitions and even if so, noting the different purpose of that statute, and
affirming that the reinsurance company failed to produce evidence that civil disorder had occurred).
52. Burgwin v. Mattson, 522 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming a motion for summary
judgment in a case brought against FBI agents for an arrest where charges were dropped in “the
best interests of justice”; agreeing with the district court that “concluded from the record before it
that probable cause to arrest appellants had been established . . . that in making the arrests appellees
were acting within the scope of their authority and reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest
was lawful; and that consequently appellees were immune from liability.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976).
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the Oneida Indians in New York.53 Most interestingly, there has been no
use of the statute at all since the mid-1970s. It now seems quaint to
discuss prosecutions for inciting riots, though that could change,
especially in light of the rash of recent police killings of unarmed black
men, and the civil unrest that those killings generated. The fact that the
government has essentially abandoned these provisions of the U.S. Code
tells me that they were either purely political or symbolic all along, or
that they lean so far into the First Amendment that they are not worth the
trouble to charge.
Whether or not the trial was started as a political one, it seems clear to
me that Judge Hoffman turned it into political theatre by the nature of his
engagement with the defendants and their attorneys. While federal district
judges may have less discretion regarding how to handle a prosecution
that was politically motivated (though of course Judge Hoffman could
have dismissed the indictment on grounds of selective or vindictive
prosecution),54 they do have discretion to attempt to minimize the
political dimension of a charge once it is before them.
It was unnecessary, unprofessional, and immature for a life-appointed,
ostensibly impartial federal district judge to ridicule a defendant and/or
his attorneys. And then for Judge Hoffman to paint America a picture of
a black man shackled before a primarily white courtroom and jury took
things from beyond unnecessary and at least halfway to racist, even by
1960s standards. By the judge’s own description:
[T]he Court thereupon ordered the defendant Seale removed from the
courtroom at which time he was forcibly restrained by binding and
gagging. The defendant Seale was then returned to the courtroom, but
continued to shout through the gag. The Court then ordered the marshal
to reinforce the gag.55

Why would any sane and experienced judge order such a spectacle on
his watch, during a trial he knew the media would hold under a
53. United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming 18 U.S.C. § 2101
convictions for riot activity by Oneida Indians including a gathering of thirty people to retrieve a
checkbook, an attack on a gas station, and a bingo hall break-in where two people were attacked.
“All these events involved groups larger than three people where property was damaged, or where
threats were made with the ability to immediately execute such threats. Moreover, the riots shared
common goals: to intimidate those who disagreed with the defendants and to disrupt businesses in
The Territory.”), cert. denied sub nom. Belgen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (holding that prosecution of vocal
defendants in failure to register for the draft case was not selectively prosecuted); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (finding presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor obtained felony
indictment after defendant’s appeal).
55. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 386 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting from the contempt
citations drafted by Judge Hoffman in the appendix to the opinion).

944

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

microscope? It certainly was not required by law. It is true that there was
a very recent Seventh Circuit decision very close to this time where the
panel held that it was improper for a disruptive and disrespectful
defendant to be excluded from his trial, and the proper course “was to
have restrained the defendant by whatever means necessary, even if those
means included his being shackled and gagged.”56 Moreover, Judge
Hoffman did read this opinion, as well as its bitter dissent.57 However,
the holding in that case clearly did not mandate such a procedure.58
Shortly after the Seale case, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling that a defendant can never lose his Sixth Amendment
right to be present at his trial and confront witnesses, and made it crystal
clear that shackling and gagging would be accepted as a very “last
resort.”59 Judge Hoffman could not have been influenced by the Supreme
Court’s grudging acceptance of the practice, as that opinion was not yet
rendered when Judge Hoffman ordered Mr. Seale shackled and gagged.
Judge Hoffman knew he had many options to conduct the Seale trial in
Seale’s presence; he could grant Seale the continuance so he could have
his lawyer, he could have instituted contempt proceedings (to be ruled on
by a different judge), or he could have tried killing him with kindness.
Though today’s Court has still not resolved the shackling issue,60 it seems
56. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1969) (reversing a
conviction because abusive and threatening defendant has an unqualified Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to be personally present at all stages of his trial; proper course was restraining
defendant or using contempt power). This opinion was later reversed by the Supreme Court, but
not in time to be useful to Judge Hoffman. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (reversing
United States ex rel. Allen, 413 F.2d 232).
57. See Lahav, supra note 39, at 1333–34. Dissenting Judge Hastings warned us to “imagine
the result that may occur in a criminal trial of multiple defendants who determined ‘to raise hell’
and disrupt the trial to the point of no return. Shackles, chains, gags and a courtroom full of deputy
marshals engaged in trying to keep the defendants off the floor.” United States ex rel. Allen, 413
F.2d at 235–36 (Hastings, J., dissenting).
58. As Professor Kalven noted, Judge Hoffman could have separated him, as was in fact done.
Harry Kalven, Jr., Introduction to CONTEMPT: TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS,
SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10, at xiii, xxvi (1970).
59. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (holding that judge has options to handle a disruptive defendant
including to bind and gag him, cite him for contempt, or remove him from the courtroom until he
promises to behave). Justice Black noted that shackling and gagging must be last resort because the
sight not only “might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant, but the
use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.” Id.
60. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018) (vacating Ninth Circuit en
banc ruling that in-custody defendants cannot constitutionally be routinely shackled when they
enter the courthouse in the Southern District of California for nonjury proceedings as moot because
named defendants plead guilty). Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s issue was not necessarily with
the merits of the ruling, but rather with the court attempting to treat the case as a “functional class
action” to save it from mootness. I question how the Court would have responded had the district
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quite obvious to me that its use, especially on a black defendant, will
always be worse than the alternative.
Will today’s judges face such choices? The answer to that question
might depend on whether we will see an increase in “political” cases,
under any of our previously offered definitions. A few scholars have
argued recently that much more crime is “political” than might appear at
first blush. If the definition of a “political” crime is that a major portion
of the population believes the conduct should not be criminalized, or
believes that the law is used against racial or political minorities, then
much more crime is “political” in current practice than anyone suspects.
For example, in her controversial and thoughtful bestseller The New Jim
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Professor
Alexander argues that, through the War on Drugs, the United States
criminal justice system functions as a contemporary system of racial
control over black men in America.61 It is a fact that the U.S. penal
population increased from less than 300,000 to over two million over the
last thirty years,62 and that as many as one in four young African
American men will serve time in prison if current trends continue.63 It is
also fact that while black people comprised only about 13 percent of our
population in 2014, black men made up 37 percent of the combined state
and federal male prison population at that time.64 Finally, statistics
court instead issued a nationwide injunction against the practice. See infra Part III.
61. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012) (suggesting that we have not ended racial discrimination in
this country since the height of Jim Crow, we have merely redesigned racism by labeling African
Americans as criminals).
62. DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 1, 2 fig.1 (2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf; MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 1, 55, 96
(2006) (noting that almost 3 percent of our adult population is either incarcerated in a federal or
state prison or on probation, parole, or other correctional supervision). I must note, however, that
the prison population, both state and federal, has finally started to decrease over the last few years
since 2014. See, e.g., E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1, 2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (noting that we
have over 1.5 million persons incarcerated at the federal and state levels, 2.2 million when you add
jails, and over 5 million when you add anyone under some kind of criminal justice supervision, and
that these figures in 2014 were the smallest since 2005); ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL
POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 5 tbl.2 (11th ed. 2015) (noting that the
United States incarcerated about 698 per 100,000 in 2015). This number is down from 743 per
100,000 in 2011. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON
POPULATION LIST 3 tbl.2 (9th ed. 2011).
63. Glenn Kessler, The Stale Statistic that One in Three Black Males ‘Born Today’ Will End up
in Jail, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/
2015/06/16/the-stale-statistic-that-one-in-three-black-males-has-a-chance-of-ending-up-injail/?utm_term=.c5200d26a16c.
64. CARSON, supra note 62, at 15.
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establish that 53 percent of blacks in the federal penitentiary are in for
drug-related offenses, while that figure is only 40 percent for whites.65 In
light of a growing new movement against mass incarceration that is
sensitive to the racial impact of our war on crime, many more “ordinary”
or “garden variety” criminal charges, especially drug charges, may now
be labeled, at least by some, as “political.”66 If every trial is potentially a
“political” one, perhaps we need better articulated rules for how federal
district judges should respond to certain kinds of conduct in their
courtrooms.
Some scholars have recently (within the last five years or so) suggested
that because crime has been politicized, and because the criminal justice
system has been utilized as a tool of racial oppression, we will see a sharp
rise of movements like “courtwatching,” “copwatching,” and
“participatory defense.” Scholars like Jocelyn Simonson and Janet
Moore, for example, describe these as organized movements comprised
primarily of marginalized groups such as poor people of color that work
antagonistically to the present criminal justice system, not within it.67 We
might also include here the legal and social justice movement known as
“Black Lives Matter,” or any other group that believes it should not
necessarily work within the criminal justice system, since that is run and
maintained by privileged insiders, but should facilitate critical resistance
65. Id. at 17.
66. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 61, at 181; Kurt L. Schmoke, Foreword to STEVEN B.
DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE
AGAINST DRUGS, at xiii (1993) (arguing that “addiction is a disease to be treated and that criminal
sanctions create far more crime than they stop”); Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of
Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 11, 17 (arguing that much of the harm associated with drug
use is caused by the fact that drugs are illegal); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1969, 1970 (2008) (arguing that the decline of local control over criminal justice systems
coupled with increasing control of suburban voters, legislators, and appellate judges has led to
disproportionate criminal punishment of urban black neighborhoods); Drug Courts, NAT’L INST.
JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/pages/welcome.aspx (last visited June 9,
2019) (stating over 3,000 drug courts were operating in the United States as of June 2015, which
have focused on treatment rather than incarceration and have been found to be much more effective
at reducing the re-arrest rate than traditional incarceration).
67. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 352, 356 (2015) (examining the tactics of and challenges to the Movement for Black
Lives); Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for
Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2015) (describing participatory defense as
a means of reforming public defense and mass incarceration); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The
People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 265 (2019); Jocelyn Simonson,
Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1617 (2017) (describing how movement actors engage in communal acts of resistance throughout
the criminal process); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 393 (2016)
(describing the practice of organized copwatching by marginalized populations).
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from below. Examples of such collective resistance are community bail
funds,68 surrounding police when they detain a black teen,69 and
participatory defense teams that create biographical videos about
defendants70 and encourage letter-writing and visiting the wrongly
incarcerated.71 Examples solely of courtwatching include packing the
audience section of a courtroom to demonstrate support for the accused,72
wearing pins or T-shirts to support the defendant rather than the victim,73
and simply observing in order to present the results to the community. 74
I can personally attest to one example of the kind of activity that one
could label “courtwatching,” though it was in a state, not a federal,
courtroom. In March of 2016, I began working on a habeas appeal in a
case styled Miller v. Director.75 Mr. Miller, at the time a twenty-year-old
68. Our Mission, CHI. COMMUNITY BOND FUND, https://www.chicagobond.org/#our_clients
(last visited June 9, 2019) (describing stories of people in Chicago for whom the Community Bond
Fund has posted bail for defendants unrelated to them).
69. Activists Helping Teen Detained by Police Pepper Sprayed in Cleveland, AL JAZEERA (July
27, 2015, 4:40 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/27/black-lives-matter-activistspepper-sprayed-in-cleveland.html.
70. See, e.g., Moore et al., supra note 67, at 1285–86; Mariame Kaba, Free Us All: Participatory
Defense Campaigns as Abolitionist Organizing, NEW INQUIRY (May 8, 2017),
https://thenewinquiry.com/free-us-all/ (discussing the possibility of freeing prisoners and
improving justice through collective organizing); Photo Recap: National Social Biography Media
Boot Camp!, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (June 6, 2017), https://acjusticeproject.org/
2017/06/06/photo-recap-national-social-biography-media-boot-camp/ (describing meeting of
participatory defense hubs from around the country to share strategies for creating biographical
videos of defendants for potential use in court).
71. Defense Campaign Toolkit, SURVIVED & PUNISHED, http://www.survivedandpunished.org/
sp-toolkit.html (last visited June 9, 2019) (describing movement to eliminate incarceration through
building defense committees, letter-writing to incarcerated survivors, working with lawyers, and
crowdfunding defense).
72. See, e.g., Let’s Pack the Courtroom for Eric’s Preliminary Hearing!, BAY AREA ANTI
REPRESSION COMMITTEE (July 24, 2017), https://antirepressionbayarea.comlets-pack-thecourtroom-for-erics-preliminary-hearing/ (calling for supporters of an activist arrested during a
demonstration to “pack the court” at his preliminary hearing). Similarly, police officers frequently
pack the courtroom against a defendant when the victim was another peace officer. See Bruce
Youngblood, Letters to the Editor: May 15, 2018, STATESMAN (May 15, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.statesman.com/news/20180514/letters-to-the-editor-may-15-2018 (suggesting that
the judge should not have allowed a bevy of uniformed police officers to attend the sentencing
phase of a trial against Mr. Harrell, who shot a SWAT officer).
73. See, e.g., Michael Shatz, Winn Trial Begins; Judge Says Shirts in Support of Defendant
Barred, KAN. EXPOSED (July 20, 2015), https://kansasexposed.com/2015/07/20/winn-trial-beginsjudge-says-shirts-in-support-of-defendant-barred/ (describing judge who banned individuals
wearing shirts in support of the defendant, but who allowed victims’ rights advocates to wear shirts
indicating their support in other trials).
74. See, e.g., Help Stop Over-Incarceration in Cook County, COMMUNITY RENEWAL SOC’Y
(July 25, 2015), https://www.communityrenewalsociety.org/blog/help-stop-over-incarcerationcook-county (discussing the planned eight-week court watching program).
75. See Miller v. Director, No. 6:15-cv-00535, 2018 WL 1148105 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2018).
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college football player, was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death
for the murder of his young son.76 His argument, aside from actual
innocence, was that the two white prosecutors violated equal protection
and due process by injecting irrelevant considerations of race throughout
the trial.77 For example, they belittled the way he wore his hair (referring
to his “dreadlock” hairstyle and “muscular” body), castigated the family
for being poor (living in Section 8 housing) and having relatively minor
misdemeanor criminal records, attacked the size of his immediate family
(especially minor children and the number of “baby daddies”) as well as
the way they spelled their Christian names, and, finally, made fun of the
way the defendant and his friends talked about “white folks.” Mr. Miller’s
large extended family attempted to watch his trial wearing purple shirts
to indicate support. The prosecution was able to bar his family and friends
from attending the trial by invoking the rule against witnesses.78
Finally, the government succeeded in insinuating that the defendant’s
family constituted a gang that presented a threat to the safety of the jury,
convincing the judge to station two uniformed guards at the door to the
courtroom and requiring deputy accompaniment for each juror from the
jury room to their cars. The prosecutor was able to scare the white judge,
jurors, and observers by generating a circus-like atmosphere where
essentially every member of the community who supported Mr. Miller
(and who was black) had to wait outside in the hallway because of the no
witness rule. The state court judge, an elected official in Texas, did
absolutely nothing to discipline the government for its obnoxious
behavior. Though the prosecutor was the cause of this, he regularly
Lead counsel was Steptoe & Johnson LLP, a large Washington D.C. based firm that took the matter
on pro bono.
76. See Miller v. State, No. AP-76270, 2012 WL 1868406 (Tex. Crim. App. May 23, 2012)
(affirming conviction and sentence).
77. The jury consisted of eleven white jurors and two white alternates.
78. The government accomplished this by having one of their investigators show up at the
defendant’s sister’s house, where she was holding a support meeting. This investigator, Mr.
Lazarus, wrote down the names of all attendees, as well as family and friends who did not attend.
Then the government placed each of these names on a on a witness list and subpoenaed them for
trial. On the morning before the trial started, the prosecutor rounded up all forty-six AfricanAmerican friends and family members of defendant and swore them in, thus effectively barring
them from the courtroom as observers. The government’s sixth amended witness list had over 600
names on it, of whom they called less than twenty-five total (for the punishment and guilt phases).
Of the forty-six Miller supporters sworn in as witnesses, only eight testified. In my opinion, the list
was merely subterfuge to keep black faces out of the courtroom. Equally alarmingly, the
government was able to scare his mother from testifying in his defense at the punishment stage by
threatening her with arrest for a minor probation violation regarding a minor misdemeanor
conviction should she show up. Declaration of Susan R. Klein, Miller v. Stephen, No. 6:15-cv00535-MAC-ZJH, 2018 WL 1148105 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2016).
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referenced to the white jurors and white audience the large number of
black individuals wearing purple T-shirts or ribbons and carrying signs
congregating in the hallway, as if they were up to no good. 79 No rational
person could read the transcript of this trial and do other than conclude
that the trial was “political,” at least if politics includes race-baiting. This
was precisely the kind of case that rightly fuels public and academic
criticism of the criminal justice system in general, and the death penalty
in particular, as unfairly implemented based upon race. This trial
desperately needed some courtwatching.
If there actually is an increase in the occurrence of courtwatching, as
the above-mentioned scholars anticipate, many federal judges will have
to exercise great restraint in their courtrooms to refrain from overreacting,
and they may be forced to discipline prosecutors as well as audience
members who are behaving badly. Today’s judge reacting publicly to
courtwatchers must refrain from making the same mistakes Judge
Hoffman made. However, I am not optimistic regarding the strength of
the new movement. The examples I could find, both in checking the
footnotes of scholarly research and reviewing local and national
newspapers, show very small and localized groups, and none of the
websites I checked when Professor Simonson’s articles were first
published a few years ago appear to have any larger followings today. It
does not appear to me that any of the groups involved in these movements
expanded much. My admittedly pessimistic view is that such movements
will not spread enough to do much good.
I believe this for the same reasons that I cannot get either of my
college-age children to vote:80 the grand weight of apathy and inertia. But
the failure of the “courtwatching” or any other social justice movement
that involves mild opposition to criminal justice officials to expand will
not ultimately negate the good work that having observers in the
courtroom generates. Courtwatching is something that can be done on an
individual basis, despite the scholarly definitions to the contrary. Any
person with an iPhone or camera can sit in on any trial and report judicial,
prosecutorial, or law enforcement misbehavior, so the rest of us can be

79. Id.
80. They joined the almost 60 percent of eligible voters ages 18 to 29 who couldn’t be bothered
to vote during the last presidential election. Census data on voting available at: Thom File, Voting
in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 10, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html.
Elections Project data available at: Michael McDonald, Voter Turnout Demographics, U.S.
ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/demographics (last visited
June 9, 2019).
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alerted to future Chicago Seven-type trials.81 I believe the behavior I
witnessed in the Miller case, as well as the prosecutor’s grandstanding in
the Chicago Seven trial, would not have been tolerated by the judge or in
the court of public opinion had the trial been observed and recorded by
reporters or captured on film. It is technology, and not the courtwatching
movement, that can prevent judicial excess.
Scholars have long debated whether courtroom observers (as
individuals or parts of movements) should be allowed to use their
smartphones and computers in court.82 Separate from the issue of whether
courtwatchers are going to transform everyday court proceedings into
political theatre, there is the issue of what devices the media should be
allowed to use. Journalists and other courtroom observers are now
holding smartphones, tablets, and other small computers so that they can
photograph, blog, and tweet the trials and other proceedings that they
observe. For example, though the 2012 manslaughter trial of Dr. Conrad
Murray for the killing of superstar Michael Jackson was not televised,
one reporter at a local news station sent out 1,900 tweets a day.83
By the mid-1990s, TV cameras were permissible in criminal
courtrooms in forty-six states, with judicial approval.84 Scholars and
judges hoping to stop or even slow this tide of cameras in the courtroom
are fighting a battle, which they will and should lose. I say this despite
watching first-hand how TV cameras helped destroy any chance for the
government to receive a fair trial in the O.J. Simpson matter.85 Judge Ito’s
mistakes were not in his decision to allow filming; it was his inability to
fairly handle the myriad of problems that accompany any new
technology. The arguments against the technology include that cameras
81. Of course, individual courtwatchers or members of a social movement like Black Lives
Matter can enter a courtroom at any moment and act disruptively, forcing a federal judge to respond.
82. Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and
Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573 (2013).
83. Bruce Carton, Is Tweeting from the Courtroom by Reporters Too Distracting for Jurors?,
LAW.COM: LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Apr. 6, 2012, 4:21 PM), https://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/
legal_blog_watch/2012/04/is-tweeting-from-the-courtroom-by-reporters-too-distracting-forjurors.html.
84. See David Shaw, The Shaping and Spinning of The Story That Hijacked America, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-09/news/ss-55101_1_simpson-case.
Cameras are allowed in courtrooms in almost all states today. See Cameras in the Courts: State by
State Guide, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N, https://www.rtdna.org/
content/cameras_in_court (last visited June 9, 2019).
85. Shaw, supra note 84 (“One thing is already clear: However unwittingly at times, the media
played a pivotal role in this most bizarre drama.”); see Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV—That Is the
Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928 (1996) (questioning the wisdom of allowing cameras
in court, noting the high profile O.J. Simpson case, and highlighting the twenty million viewers
with access to the Court TV network in the early 1990s).
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physically disrupt judicial order and decorum, that they distract the jury
and impede proper fact-finding by encouraging showmanship by those
on camera, and that they are a threat to the personal security of all trial
participants.86 Older Supreme Court justices appear especially worried
that “soundbites” will be taken out of context, and that they might be the
butt of jokes.87
Arguments in favor of the practice generally start with a 1980 Supreme
Court case holding that state and federal criminal trials are presumptively
open to the media and the public.88 According to the Court, open trials
serve as a check on government power, helping to ensure that defendants
receive a fair trial; they serve the public interest by promoting public
understanding of the judicial process and confidence in the fair
administration of justice, and finally they have a “significant community
therapeutic value” when a “shocking crime occurs.”89 Since the Court
86. See Packer, supra note 82, at 578–79 (summation of opposition argument). See also Nancy
S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1489, 1513 (2012)
(outlining the concern about the effect on participants in the courtroom, including the witnesses,
jurors, and lawyers).
87. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT
NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL
ARGUMENTS 221 (2017) (noting that Justice Souter said that televising of the Court’s hearings
would be “over his dead body”); Am. Constitution Soc’y, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer in Conversation with Associate Dean Alan Morrison, YOUTUBE (June 12, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksuRCixAto8 (stating in the interview, that cameras in the
courtroom would be a “risk” and that there is “no going back”); Associated Press, On Cameras in
Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-souter-says-over-mydead-body.html (noting that Justice Souter “minced no words” on the subject of cameras in the
courtroom); Robert Kessler, Why Aren’t Cameras Allowed at the Supreme Court Again?,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/case-allowingcameras-supreme-court-proceedings/316876/ (quoting Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy expressing reservations against televised court hearings). Nevertheless, in 2016 the ABA
House of Delegates passed a resolution urging the Supreme Court to televise its proceedings.
Lorelei Laird, Supreme Court Should Make Video of Oral Arguments Available to Public, ABA
House Urges, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/supreme_court_should_make_video_of_oral_arguments_available_to_public_aba_h.
Even the younger justices, who, at their confirmation hearings, expressed some openness to the
idea, appear to now have greater apprehension toward video in federal courts. See Matt Sedensky
& Sam Hananel, Supreme Court’s Kagan, Sotomayor Rethink Support for Cameras in the
Courtroom, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
supreme-courts-kagan-sotomayor-rethink-support-for-cameras-in-the-courtroom/2015/02/02/1fb9
c44c-ab34-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6d031b20ba24.
88. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980) (using the
“experience and logic” test to determine whether a particular judicial proceeding can be closed).
See generally Packer, supra note 82, at 574–77. Of course, media interest in criminal cases started
with the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of baby Charles A. Lindbergh,
Jr. See Shaw, supra note 84.
89. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–71.
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gave states the right to experiment with allowing cameras in their
courts,90 there are now laws permitting cameras in the courtroom in
almost every state, resulting in shows on channels such as Court TV that
film criminal trials from voir dire to verdict.91
Since these experiments began, it appears to me that none of the
opposition’s arguments have stood the test of time. As Professor West
has convincingly written, television adds to a trial’s transparency;
improvements in technology mean that cameras are no longer disruptive,
and televising the Court’s proceedings “provide the public with more
information about the [Court] and [would] produce more accountability.
. . . [T]he fear of grandstanding . . . is not yet a fear that is supported by
the vast and growing experience with cameras in courtrooms.”92 Former
Judge Posner, in his new book on the subject, answers the “soundbites”
and “threats” argument by reporting that “there has never been an adverse
incident—a threat to a judge seen on television, an assault, an insult, an
angry letter—by someone who had seen the judge in a televised
argument.”93 Judges’ and justices’ fear of looking silly can be combatted
by self-restraint, rather than limiting public access to critical information.
The federal judiciary has been much slower than the states in allowing
cameras. However, despite Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53, many
federal judges allow tweeting and blogging from their courtroom.94 The
90. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574–75 (1981) (holding that cameras in the courtroom
was not an automatic violation of a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
to a fair trial).
91. Court TV launched in 1991 and covered prominent criminal trials such as the O.J. Simpson
trial in 1995 and the Menendez brothers’ trial in 1994. It was bought by Time Warner and became
In Sessions in 2008, and it ended in 2014. It is now a channel devoted to bad, court-themed reality
TV shows, called TruTV. Online coverage of many criminal trials is now at CNN.com’s “Crime”
section. This exempts jury deliberation, which of course should remain private. See Pena-Rodriguez
v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017) (holding a juror finding a defendant guilty based on racial
bias creates an exception to the generally beneficial Federal Rule of Evidence 606 and noting that
a no-impeachment rule that promotes “full and vigorous discussion by providing jurors with
considerable assurance that after being discharged they will not be summoned to recount their
deliberations” and gives “stability and finality to verdicts”). A number of smaller scale, independent
court TV channels are budding. One example is LAW & CRIME, https://lawandcrime.com/ (last
visited June 9, 2019).
92. Sonja R. West, The Monster in the Courtroom, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1953, 1964. See also
Erwin Chemerinsky & Eric J. Segall, Cameras Belong in the Supreme Court, JUDICATURE,
Summer 2017, at 14 (noting that the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court issued its Brexit decision
on live streaming service, and arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s bar against allowing oral
argument or decision announcement to be broadcasted or live streamed is a national embarrassment,
especially when C-SPAN is willing to cover them at its own expense).
93. POSNER, supra note 87, at 219. Judge Posner cites to his friend Judge Kozinski, a judge on
the Ninth Circuit since 1985.
94. Rule 53, adopted in 1946, bars the taking of photographs in a courtroom or the broadcasting
of judicial proceedings from the courtroom, and the 1972 Judicial Conference clause to the Code
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United States Judicial Conference conducted what many scholars
considered a successful pilot program that allowed for the use of cameras
in federal district courts to record civil proceedings, though it
unfortunately closed it after four years.95 Nevertheless, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit announced early in the summer of 2017 that
it will begin livestreaming audio of all oral arguments with its 2018–2019
term.96 This is the third federal court of appeals to livestream its oral
arguments. The Ninth Circuit has regularly allowed livestreaming of
audio for arguments, and the Fourth Circuit does it for major cases.97 The
of Conduct for United States Judges prohibits “broadcasting in both criminal and civil
proceedings.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 53; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON
3(A)(7) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 1989) (repealed in 1990). But see FED. R. CRIM. P.
57(b) (permitting a judge to regulate her courtroom). In 1996, the U.S. Judicial Commission
reversed its absolute ban on cameras from the federal court and left it up to the individual judge.
Once the pilot program ended in 2016, the two federal circuit courts and fourteen federal district
courts that had allowed video recordings of their proceedings under these programs were simply
allowed to continue using cameras after the conclusion of the pilot program. To lift the ban on
cameras would require that the Judicial Conference amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
that Congress enact a statute allowing or requiring cameras in the courtroom. See CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44514, VIDEO BROADCASTING FROM THE FEDERAL COURTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3
(2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160601_R44514_2522b097461fe5a9bb3230406
a45d3b926810e83.pdf [hereinafter BROADCASTING FROM FEDERAL COURTS].
95. Katherine Geldmacher, Note, Behind Closed Doors: Why the Federal Judiciary’s Decision
to Keep Cameras Out of District Courts was a Mistake, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 753, 754 (2017)
(describing Judicial Conference pilot program in 2010 wherein fourteen district courts recorded
and edited civil proceedings with the consent of the participating parties and the presiding judge,
and then posted the recordings on the U.S. Courts website and made them free to the public).
Though the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management which oversaw the
implementation of the program concluded that it did not produce sufficiently persuasive evidence
of a benefit to the federal judiciary to justify a change in the use of cameras policy, Geldmacher
argued persuasively that this recommendation was a mistake. See also Jordan M. Singer, Judges
on Demand: The Cognitive Case for Cameras in the Courtroom, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 79,
92 (2015) (suggesting that the Judicial Conference of the United States’ “Cameras in Courts” pilot
program should be extended, as participants did not perceive cameras to have adverse effects).
Professor Singer notes as well that the FJC reviewed studies on the impact of the electronic media
in twelve state courts and concluded that the cameras were not “distracting or anxiety-inducing to
witnesses, and did not influence juror deliberations or outcomes.” Id. at 82 (citing Molly Treadway
Johnson & Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Electronic Media Coverage of Federal Civil
Proceedings: An Evaluation of the Pilot Program in Six District Courts and Two Courts of Appeals
39–41 (1994), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/elecmediacov.pdf).
96. Melissa Heelan Stanzione, D.C. Circuit Will Livestream Argument Audio Next Term,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-andcriminal-law/dc-circuit-will-livestream-argument-audio-next-term. The only exceptions to the live
stream will be discussions of classified or sealed material.
97. Id. (according to Gabe Roth, a courtwatcher with Fix the Court). Fix the Court is a grassroots
organization that advocates for a more open and accountable Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit
uploads the video to both its own website and YouTube. See Audio and Video, U.S. CT. APPEALS
FOR NINTH CIR., http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/ (last visited June 10, 2019); U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCeIMdiBTNT
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Seventh Circuit began offering video coverage of some of its oral
arguments late summer of 2018.98
Regardless of one’s personal feelings about cameras in the courtroom,
technology is a runaway train that no one can catch. C-SPAN has tracked
public attitudes about cameras in courtrooms since June of 2009, and in
the 2015 version of its poll, at least 76 percent of U.S. adults surveyed
supported televising the Supreme Court’s oral arguments.99 My children
laugh at the idea that it is possible to keep cameras out of any public
space, and this appears to include, at least for them, concerts and events
where cameras are pretty clearly prohibited. The next generation is not
comprised of scofflaws; they simply cannot conceive of a camera-less
space outside their homes. Thus, unobtrusive handheld smartphones that
can record and transmit high-definition videos have been secretly brought
into and used in the Supreme Court!100 Whether we like it or not, any
hope of privacy, at least in public spaces, is dead. Inevitably, I predict
that the pure public relations problem of judges treating all litigants and
observers with respect will be solved by cameras and other technological
devices in the courtroom. Regardless of local rules, cameras in phones
have become so ubiquitous and so small that there is no way to keep them
out of the courtroom. So every judge, like every peace officer (and every
average citizen), can expect to be filmed at all times, and should behave
accordingly.101
II. FEDERAL JUDGES LOSE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY TO FEDERAL

peA84wmSRPDPg (last visited June 10, 2019).
98. Debra Cassens Weiss, Is Posner’s ‘Baffling’ Book an Ethics Breach? Chief Judge Objects
to Release of Internal Memos, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:48 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/is_posners_book_an_ethics_violation_chief_judge_objects_to_re. See also POSNER,
supra note 87.
99. ROBERT GREEN & ADAM ROSENBLATT, PENN SCHOEN BERLAND, U.S. SUPREME COURT:
KEY FINDINGS 8 (2015), https://sites.c-span.org/camerasInTheCourt/pdf/July-SCOTUS-Agenda071415_multiple-year-tracking.pdf.
100. Unauthorized videos of Supreme Court oral arguments were posted to a YouTube channel
at various times since February of 2014. See BROADCASTING FROM FEDERAL COURTS, supra note
94, at 18 n.92 (noting that while it was not clear what device filmed the proceedings, it was clearly
small enough to come in to the court undetected); see also Marder, supra note 86; Bill Mears,
Supreme Court Secretly Recorded on Camera, CNN (Feb. 27, 2014, 7:53 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/politics/supreme-court-video/.
101. Susan R. Klein & Chloe Teeter, Policing in a Democracy Without Privacy, 53 NEW ENG.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (reviewing BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT
PERMISSION (2017)).
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PROSECUTORS IN THE 1980S
As rulers of their courtrooms, federal district judges were also solely
responsible for the fate of suspects found guilty of committing a federal
criminal offense. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),
federal district judges had near absolute authority to determine criminal
sentences in their courtrooms, with essentially no appellate review.102
The judge determined whether the offender should be incarcerated and
for how long, whether he should be fined, and whether probation or some
other penalty might be a better avenue. The sentences imposed were
indeterminate, in that the Probation Commission could return an offender
to society earlier than the judge planned based upon the offender’s
rehabilitation. That all changed with the SRA, which aimed to give
similarly situated defendants similar federal sentences and to provide
notice and transparency such that a defendant can calculate her sentence
from the face of her indictment based upon the factors set forth in a
constantly evolving manual called the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(FSG). The SRA created a group of experts who wrote and amended the
FSG, and it abolished parole. Whether or not intentional at the time, the
scholarly consensus is that the effect of the SRA was to stifle judicial
discretion and move all sentencing authority to federal prosecutors.103
It was not the Act alone that transferred sentencing discretion from
judges to federal prosecutors. That shift was assisted by a combination of
legislation and Supreme Court cases that encouraged plea bargaining.
The courts allowed coercive pleas and boilerplate agreements to
constitute “voluntary and intelligent” acts by defendants.104 Congress
enacted not only the SRA but, near the same time period, a host of
mandatory minimum sentence and consecutive sentence statutes.105
Prosecutors are in complete control now through the many carrots and
102. A judge could sentence an individual anywhere within the very broad sentencing ranges
established for most federal offenses. There were no mandatory minimum penalties at this time.
The only exception to judicial authority in sentencing was the Parole Commission, who could let
reformed defendants out early. And there were no grounds on which a defendant could appeal a
sentence, unless it was outside the statutory maximum or based upon constitutional considerations.
See generally ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 3, at 1377–78.
103. See id. at 1282, 1369–70 nn. p–w (listing such scholars).
104. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor
could threaten to add a recidivism enhancement, with a mandatory life sentence, if a defendant
refused to plead guilty to a two- to ten-year felony); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758
(1970) (holding that a government’s offer of a plea to life imprisonment to avoid the death penalty
was non-coercive).
105. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012) (mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses); 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (consecutive sentences for possessing firearm in relation to crime of
violence or drug offense).
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sticks in their arsenals.106 For example, prosecutors are permitted to
threaten defendants with serious charges—such as notice of three-strike
provisions or recidivist enhancements, mandatory minimum or
consecutive sentences, or adding weapons charges with draconian
penalties, if they refuse a plea bargain. Likewise, they offer steep
sentencing discounts to those who sign, such as the 25 percent reduction
in sentencing for acceptance of responsibility, 107 dismissal of charges,108
and the possibility of escaping a mandatory minimum penalty through a
government substantial assistance motion.109
Thus, prosecutors obtained not only all the authority to set charges and
determine the contours of plea agreements, but also the power to
determine most sentences. Since they have total control over the contents
of pleas, boilerplate plea agreements now contain a host of mandatory
waivers, primarily waivers of the right to directly or collaterally attack
the conviction or the sentence, in addition to those trial-right waivers
necessary to the plea process.110 A federal district judge, from the late
106. Excuse the mixed metaphors, from Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in
Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2037 (2006) [hereinafter Klein,
Enhancing the Judicial Role] (arguing that the most pernicious problems in our new world of guilty
pleas are lack of information for defendants and a coercive process for obtaining pleas, and
suggesting that we can improve transparency and equality by amending discovery rules such that
defense attorneys receive the information necessary to determine whether the client would be found
guilty at a jury trial and whether the particular plea deal was standard, and requiring that judges
ensure this occurred during the plea colloquy); see also Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal
Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 719–34 (2005) [hereinafter
Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion] (predicting that Booker would cause a shift in
the balance of power from the prosecutor back to the judiciary, as the FSG are no longer mandatory
and judges use 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to justify any conceivable sentence she might wish to impose).
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
There is an additional one-point reduction for a “timely” plea, taken before the prosecutor begins
to prepare for trial.
108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A); note 104, supra.
109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012).
110. Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice System:
An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83–87 (2015) [hereinafter
Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System] (counting plea agreements containing Brady or
other discovery waivers, habeas waivers, and ineffective assistance of counsel waivers in arson and
Hobbs Act plea agreements from 2006 to 2010). See also Donna Lee Elm, Susan R. Klein & Elissa
C. Steglich, Immigration Defense Waivers in Federal Criminal Plea Agreements, 69 MERCER L.
REV. 839, 876–881 (2018) (arguing that plea agreements containing waivers of the right to contest
deportation are unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment); Quin M. Sorenson, Appeal Rights
Waivers: A Constitutionally Dubious Bargain, FED. LAW., Oct./Nov. 2018, at 33,
http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2018/OctNov/Features/AppealRights-Waivers-A-Constitutionally-Dubious-Bargain.aspx?FT=.pdf. But cf. Class v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (holding that the defendant’s plea waiver of his right to appeal a sentence at
or below the judicially determined maximum sentencing guideline range did not waive, for direct
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1980s until about the mid-2000s, had very little control over the length of
a sentence; she would simply read the plea agreement and then calculate
the sentence within a 25 percent range based upon the facts surrounding
the offense and the offender listed in the FSG. Moreover, she did not have
the opportunity to assess the facts surrounding the actual offenses
committed by the defendant, and could not easily discover ineffective
assistance of counsel in investigating the charges or negotiating the
plea.111 Federal judges, at both the trial and appellate levels, became little
more than rubber stamps in this new world of guilty pleas. While judges
could theoretically still reject a subset of plea bargains112 or offer
“downward departures” from guideline sentences they considered too
steep,113 Congress and the DOJ in the mid-2000s did all they could to
“stamp out every vestige of judicial leniency at federal sentencing.” 114
However, I see some not insignificant reversal of this trend since 2005.
The Court returned federal district judges much of their pre-1984
sentencing discretion in United States v. Booker.115 This decision
appellate review, defendant’s constitutional claims that the statute of conviction violated the
Second Amendment).
111. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System, supra note 110, at 94–114 (suggesting
that plea waivers of effective assistance of counsel and the right to collaterally attack a sentence
are unethical and unconstitutional, as they leave the sentencing judge unable to determine whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights).
112. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A) governs a plea agreement where the defendant pleads guilty
in exchange for the prosecutor dismissing charges, 11(c)(1)(B) involves a plea where the
government recommends a sentence but such sentence does not bind the court, and 11(c)(1)(C)
agreements mandate a particular sentence agreed upon by the parties. The judge can reject a plea
under (c)(1)(A) or (c)(1)(C), but they must accept a plea under (c)(1)(B). Pleas pursuant to
11(c)(1)(B), which judges cannot reject and which, pre-Booker, forced the judge to sentence within
the FSG, are by far the most common. The third type of plea, for a set sentence, was always the
most rare, as it takes away all judicial discretion at sentencing, even the discretion to sentence
within a guideline range.
113. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97–100 (1996) (rejecting DOJ’s request for a de novo
standard of appellate review for sentencing departures, and ruling that district courts can make
departure decisions for unusual cases using an “abuse of discretion” standard). See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (2012) (allowing judges to depart downward from the FSG for cases in which there exists
“an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines”).
114. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial
“Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 519, 519 (2009). This was accomplished in large measure by the Feeney Amendment of 2003,
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). See Klein & Thompson, supra, at 519
(explaining how and why a true sentencing reform movement that began in the mid-1980s was coopted by conservative politics at the federal level at the turn of this century, thereby eliminating
one avenue of change entirely for all federal and state actors).
115. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In addition to making the FSG advisory and
eliminating appellate review for conformity with the guidelines, Booker also requires review of
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generates more of an impact with each passing year. Judges are feeling
freer to ignore the guidelines, almost always sentencing below the nowadvisory range. In fiscal year 2003, when the guidelines were mandatory,
about 70 percent of defendants received within-guidelines sentences.116
By fiscal year 2012, seven years after Booker, only about 52 percent of
all defendants received a within-guidelines sentence.117 During the last
year for which statistics are available, 2017, federal district judges
sentenced within the established guideline range only 49.1 percent of the
time!118 These federal district judges imposed sentences higher than that
recommended by the guidelines in 2.9 percent of the cases, and sentenced
below the FSG range in 47.9 percent of the cases.119 Likewise, sentence
length has decreased almost every year since Booker. The average federal
sentence between 2005 and 2007 was 54 months; from 2008 to 2011 it
was down to 49 months, and by 2018 it dropped to 44 months.120 Clearly,
these judges are receiving the message that at least some of their
discretion has come home to roost.121
Judges could take one further step to increase their discretion in
sentencing, especially after a set of revolutionary Supreme Court cases in
2012, Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, which clarified the right to
effective assistance of counsel at the plea negotiation stage of a criminal

sentences for “reasonableness” under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 259–60
(Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion). Thus the more searching de novo review, mandated by
Congress in the PROTECT Act, is unconstitutional because it gives the Guidelines too much
binding force. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 779 (2008).
116. See PATTI B. SARIS ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING
IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 5, 58 (2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/bookerreports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf [hereinafter USSC BOOKER REPORT].
117. See ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 3, at 1475 (deriving data from U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2012 (last visited June 11, 2019)).
118. USSC SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at S-53 tbl.N.
119. Id.
120. USSC BOOKER REPORT, supra note 116, at 5; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL
INFORMATION PACKET 11 tbl.7 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/1c18.pdf.
121. Not everything is rosy in this picture. While federal judges are imposing sentences below
guideline ranges, they are unfortunately returning to the bad old days of unwarranted sentencing
disparity between blacks and whites. See Susan R. Klein, Sentencing Reductions Versus Sentencing
Equality, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 723, 732–33 (2016) (citing USSC BOOKER REPORT, supra note 116)
(noting that when judicial leniency was at its lowest while the PROTECT ACT reigned, the
difference between similarly situated sentences for black offenders and white offenders was only 5
percent, but that in 2012, sentences for black male offenders were almost 20 percent higher than
for similarly situated white male offenders).
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proceeding.122 As early as 2006, I suggested that the Advisory Committee
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure amend Rules 11 (governing
plea bargains) and Rule 16 (governing discovery obligations) to allow
federal judges to become more involved in the plea negotiation
process.123 In 2013, I suggested that the Advisory Committee create two
non-waivable Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, Rules 11.1
(mandatory pre-plea conference) and 11.2 (revised plea acceptance
colloquy), that would allow district judges to better monitor the plea
process for accuracy (actual guilt) and to ensure no unwarranted
sentencing disparities,124 the twin goals that five justices suggested
animated their high-profile 2012 plea bargaining cases.125 I recommend
that we create a pre-plea discovery conference, and expand our current
Rule 11 plea colloquy. The new hearing would ensure that prosecutors
produce discovery and defense counsel properly investigates the case
before plea negotiations conclude, and that all plea offers be transcribed
into the record. The expanded judicial questioning at the plea hearing
would require that all sentencing outcomes are reduced to writing and
that waivers be explained to defendants, especially any waivers of
discovery, prosecutorial misconduct, or ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. This would give federal judges one more tool in releasing a
potentially innocent suspect from a bad plea deal, and give them mastery
over an unduly harsh penalty, and prevent prosecutors from simply
bargaining around defendants’ enhanced Sixth Amendment claims.126
122. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to
communicate the prosecutor’s plea offer to the defendant constituted deficient performance under
the first prong of Strickland’s test); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 150–51 (2012) (holding that
where government conceded defense counsel’s performance was deficient when he told his client
erroneously that he would get a lower sentence after trial than by accepting the plea, case must be
remanded to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by his fair trial). Both of these were
5-4 decisions.
123. See Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role, supra note 106, at 2042–52 (arguing that the most
pernicious problems in our new world of guilty pleas are lack of information for defendants and a
coercive process for obtaining pleas, suggesting that we can improve transparency and equality by
amending the discovery rules such that defense attorneys receive the information necessary to
determine whether the client would be found guilty at a jury trial and whether the particular plea
deal was standard, and requiring that judges ensure this occurred during the plea colloquy); see also
Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion, supra note 106, at 719–34 (predicting that Booker
would cause a shift in the balance of power from the prosecutor back to the judiciary, as the FSG
are no longer mandatory and judges use 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to justify any conceivable sentence
they might wish to impose).
124. Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 564–76 (2013).
125. Id. at 563.
126. See Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System, supra note 110, at 106 (suggesting
that a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage is unethical,
unwise, and unconstitutional).
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III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND CURRENT NATIONWIDE
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
I do not see judges’ basic day-to-day control over their courtrooms
changing much since the 1960s, and I don’t think they have yet regained
the sentencing discretion they possessed prior to the 1980s. Are there
areas of the law, particularly in the criminal justice arena, where federal
judicial discretion for district court judges is on the rise? I think so.127
There are a number of recent examples of federal district judges, in nonclass action settings, issuing universal nationwide injunctions that
prohibit the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order not only
against the plaintiff but against anyone. Such injunctions stop the federal
government from taking action to enforce federal law not just against
plaintiffs, and not just within that district judge’s district or even her
circuit. This practice, though used a few times in the sixties,128 became
more popular as red-state courts in places like Texas issued nationwide
injunctions against President Obama’s environmental and healthcare
policies.129 Famously, such an injunction was used to halt Democratic
127. Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform, 72 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 191 (2018) (examining a trend beginning in the 1990s of Article III trial
and appellate judges engaging in criminal justice activism through dicta of judicial opinions,
articles, speeches, and other extra-judicial activities).
128. Professor Bray traces the rise of the national injunction to the desegregation cases of the
1950s and 1960s. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417, 454–57 (2017).
129. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121, at
*46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (Republican appointee Judge Sam R. Cummings issued a national
preliminary injunction against a Department of Labor regulation called the “persuader rule”); Texas
v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (Republican appointee Judge Reed
O’Connor granted a national preliminary injunction, which blocked Obama-era DOJ guidance that
included “gender identity” in the definition of “sex” and required schools to allow students to use
bathrooms/facilities of their choice or risk the loss of Title IX funding), order clarified, 2016 WL
7852331, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (emphasizing that the injunction applies nationwide and
that other statutory duties are not impacted by the injunction), stay denied, 2016 WL 7852330, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2016) (reemphasizing the nationwide scope of the injunction in denying a
stay of the injunction’s application to “non-plaintiff states and entities”), appeal dismissed, 2017
WL 7000562, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2017); Charlie Savage, In Shift, Justice Dept. Says Law
Doesn’t Bar Transgender Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/05/us/politics/transgender-civil-rights-act-justice-department-sessions.html (explaining
then-AG Jeff Sessions’s order for the DOJ to take the position that gender identity is not included
in the definition of sex—a complete reversal of the Obama-era stance). Associated Builders &
Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL 8188655, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24,
2016) (Republican appointee Judge Marcia A. Crone issued preliminary injunction against
enforcement of a regulation that required federal contractors to report labor violations); Nevada v.
United States Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531–34 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (Democratic appointee
Judge Amos L. Mazzant issued a national preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a
Department of Labor regulation that would make four million workers eligible for overtime pay),
appeal docketed, No. 16-41606 (5th Cir. Dec. 1, 2016); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F.
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President Barack Obama’s policy deferring deportation for Dreamers.130
Showing anyone’s ox can be gored, liberals later used it against
Republican President Trump. A district judge in California issued a
preliminary injunction against an executive order on “sanctuary
cities.”131 Shortly thereafter, federal judges in Washington and in Hawaii
temporarily stopped President Trump’s travel ban.132
Even those who strongly oppose the ban should recognize the
extraordinary authority such a legal doctrine offers a single unelected
federal official. Recently, scholars have begun to both notice this legal
maneuver and argue about its propriety. Professor Bray argues that
federal district judges have no statutory or equitable authority to issue
national injunctions, despite their relatively recent emergence on the
scene.133 The disadvantages of such injunctions are straightforward:
First, they incentivize forum shopping. Thus we see anti-Trump plaintiffs
run to California, while anti-Obama folks head to Texas (even when they
Supp. 3d 660, 695–96 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (Republican appointee Judge Reed O’Connor issued a
national preliminary injunction against a rule interpreting an antidiscrimination provision in the
Affordable Care Act).
130. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (Judge Andrew S. Hanen,
a Republican appointee, granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibited the
implementation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
program (DAPA) and expansion of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in the DAPA
Directive), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (mem.).
131. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (Judge William
H. Orrick granted the motions for a nationwide preliminary injunction where defendants were
enjoined from enforcing an executive order against sanctuary cities), appeal dismissed as moot,
No. 17-16886, 2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). See also Knight First Amendment Inst.
v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that President Trump blocking users
on Twitter was unconstitutional but declining to issue an injunction under the assumption that the
President would remedy the blocking), appeal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. June 5, 2018).
132. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)
(granting temporary restraining order against implementation of President Trump’s first executive
order restricting entry by individuals from seven countries). The executive order challenged here
was subsequently replaced by a second order, which was stayed in part by the Supreme Court. See
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–89 (2017) (per curiam). It was
vacated and dismissed as moot in Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
President Trump’s third executive order on the travel ban was also the subject of a successful
national injunction in State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting
temporary restraining order), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th
Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
133. Bray, supra note 128, at 420 (suggesting a rule, which could be adopted by the Supreme
Court or Congress, that a federal court give a plaintiff-protective injunction only with respect to the
particular plaintiff before that judge). Additional scholars critical of the national injunction include
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower
Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
2095 (2017); Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A
Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (2017).
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are not from there). If a plaintiff loses in front of a particular district judge
(who upholds the challenged law), that decision has no effect on other
potential plaintiffs (anyone who disagrees with the policy), who can then
simply challenge the law before an alternate judge. Once a district judge
invalidates the executive action and issues a national injunction, that
controls the executive with respect to everyone. Second, the injunctions
increase the risk of conflicting injunctions, as different federal district
judges have different opinions about the legality of key executive action.
With a rule that awards the prize to the first plaintiff to receive an
injunction anywhere in the United States, we eliminate the percolation of
legal questions through different courts of appeals, which would allow
each circuit to carefully consider each matter and draft reasoned opinions
that, though they may well clash, can aid in the ultimate resolution of the
issue by the Supreme Court. Third, they arrest the development of the
law. The answer is given quickly and definitively by a single federal
judge, who will not have benefitted of opposing viewpoints. And since
the same judge deciding the merits of the policy also selects the remedy,
she will always impose a national injunction, as she will always believe
that her underlying decision was sound.
I would add to this list the pure unseemliness of those opposed to a
sitting president’s policy running off to a jurisdiction where that president
lacks support and playing to a branch of government that probably should
not be making policy. Plaintiffs in both parties have done this, as
Republicans file their lawsuits in conservative Texas when the
administration is full of Democrats, and Democrats high-tail it to treeloving California when the president is a Republican. None of this cloaks
federal judges with the appearance of impartiality; and all the judges
imposing such injunctions, no matter their party affiliation, appear
activist.134
On the other side, defenders of these injunctions argue that they ensure
that individuals who did not challenge the unconstitutional federal law
134. Professor Bray provides a nice example of this. Imagine the appearance of impropriety had
the federal district judge in Florida who held that President Obama’s signature healthcare law was
unconstitutional also granted an injunction, as twenty-six states requested, rather than the
declaratory judgment he did order. That might have resulted in the death of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) even though the Supreme Court was soon to declare the district judge wrong on the
merits. See Bray, supra note 128, at 460; see generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519 (2012). Though arguably that would not have been such a big deal, as President Trump
has managed to kill the act in any case, it is better to have such an obviously partisan move done
by a politician rather than a judge. See Bray, supra note 128, at 449, 460–61 (asserting that these
were acts of “judicial restraint” and that the court could have decided differently without it being
an abuse of discretion).
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are treated identically to plaintiffs who did so, they provide national
uniformity, and finally that nationwide injunctions give the judiciary a
needed tool to immediately check the Executive Branch.135 For example,
the ACLU suggests that President Trump’s travel ban inflicts irreparable
harm on those attempting to enter the United States from one of the
banned countries, and that it would be unjust to grant relief only to those
plaintiffs that filed suit, and not parties similarly situated to those
plaintiffs.136 One might respond that the judge deciding the merits will
likely believe the injunction is necessary, while other judges might give
more weight to the extraordinary disruption of agency policies caused by
such a ban. Or that the injunction supporters might feel less supportive
when it is their candidate’s policies that are being enjoined. The
supporters of nationwide injunctions appeal to judicial self-restraint to
answer the critiques above, despite the fact that such an appeal has not
been particularly successful in reigning in such injunctions over the last
few years.
The Supreme Court punted ruling on the legitimacy of a single judge
blocking executive policies in its 5-4 decision, which reversed the
injunction and upheld President Trump’s travel ban.137 Justice Thomas
has commented and condemned this relatively recent and expanding
practice, that he calls “universal injunctions,” in his concurring opinion
upholding President Trump’s travel ban.138 Though he wholeheartedly
agreed with the majority’s decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit and
uphold the ban, he wrote separately to express his chagrin at the remedy
that the plaintiffs had sought and obtained in this case.139 The federal
district judge issued an injunction that purported to prohibit the Executive
Branch from applying the law against anyone, not just against the
135. Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51, 54 (2017); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 57, 60 (2017). See generally Andrew Coan & David
Marcus, Article III, Remedies, and Representation, 9 CONLAWNOW 97 (2018). Coan & David do
not fit neatly into the category of injunction supporters, but are critical of Bray’s article, suggesting
that at least in some of the universal injunction cases the courts are more likely to get the issue right
than the political process. Id. at 107.
136. Amdur & Hausman, the authors of Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, are
attorneys for the ACLU, though they write in their individual capacities. Amdur & Hausman, supra
note 135.
137. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, said that
“[o]ur disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide
scope of the injunction issued by the District Court.” Id.
138. Id. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority and also noting that
the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country and aliens abroad can raise
no First Amendment claims).
139. Id. at 2424.
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plaintiffs to the lawsuit. Agreeing with and citing to Professor Bray,
Justice Thomas asserts that these injunctions “are beginning to take a toll
on the federal court system—preventing legal questions from percolating
through the federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making
every case a national emergency for the courts and for the Executive
Branch.”140 Justice Thomas is highly skeptical that district courts have
the authority to issue such injunctions under any statute or the
Constitution.141 Instead, he believes such injunctions conflict with
longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts
to decide controversies between parties.142 I agree with Justice Thomas’s
conclusion: “If federal courts continue to issue them, this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so.”143
I predict both that the Court will soon hear this issue, and that that this
Court, particularly now that President Trump replaced Justice Kennedy
with Justice Kavanaugh, may limit the practice. On April 19, 2018, a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a
nationwide injunction against President Trump’s Executive Order
13,768, a policy of withholding federal grants to so-called “sanctuary”
cities that refuse to cooperate with federal authorities to enforce federal
immigration law.144 The City of Chicago sued, challenging conditions
that Attorney General Sessions placed on the receipt of funds under the
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistant Grant Program, claiming that
they were not supported by statute and were unconstitutional.
A single judge in the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the City
with respect to two of the challenged conditions—(1) the notice
condition, which requires advance notice to federal authorities of the
release date of persons in state or local custody who are believed to be
noncitizens, and (2) the access condition, which requires local
correctional facilities to provide access to federal agents to meet with
those persons. Judge Harry Leinenweber not only enjoined the Attorney
General from enforcement of the conditions against the City of Chicago,
but on September 15, 2017, issued the injunction on a nationwide
basis.145
140. Id. at 2425.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2429.
144. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018). This opinion upheld a
nationwide ban issued by Judge Harry D. Leinenweber of the Northern District of Illinois in City
of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
145. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 951, aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated, No. 172991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).
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On June 4, 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc only
as to the geographic scope of the preliminary injunction entered by the
district court and not on the merits, but it refused to issue a stay of the
nationwide injunction.146 On June 18, 2018, the Solicitor General of the
United States asked the Supreme Court for a “partial stay,”147 and Justice
Kagan, in her role as Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit, requested a
response from the city on June 29, 2018.148 Interestingly, the Department
of Justice asked the Court only to reverse the nationwide injunction and
limit it to the district; it did not request a ruling on the merits.149 The day
that Trump v. Hawaii was rendered, June 26, 2018, the Seventh Circuit
en banc court issued an order staying the preliminary injunction “as to
geographic areas in the United States beyond the City of Chicago pending
the disposition of the case by the en banc court.”150 In light of the removal
of the nationwide stay, the solicitor general, on June 27th, withdrew his
application of a partial stay before the Supreme Court.151
A similar partial victory for President Trump on this issue occurred in
August of 2018. The Ninth Circuit voted 2-1 to uphold a lower-court
ruling from San Francisco and Santa Clara counties that declared
unconstitutional President Trump’s executive order to withhold federal
funding from counties that operate as sanctuary cities for undocumented
immigrants.152 The Ninth Circuit, a notoriously liberal one, echoed the
Seventh Circuit’s June finding that a nationwide injunction issued by a
judge in one city was too broad. The Ninth Circuit panel limited the scope
of the injunction to make it solely local.153
So, although the issue of nationwide injunctions is not presently
scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court, it may well be that the
government is waiting for the Seventh Circuit’s forthcoming en banc
146. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817.
147. Application for Stay Pending Rehearing En Banc in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit and Pending Further Proceedings in this Court at 1, Sessions v. City of Chicago,
(No. 17A1379) (June 18, 2018).
148. Order, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. June 26, 2018).
149. Application for Partial Stay Pending Rehearing En Banc in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Pending Further Proceedings in This Court at 2–3, City of
Chicago v. Sessions, (No. 17-2991) (July 20, 2018). This, of course, would prevent the Court from
skirting the issue again if it accepted the case.
150. Order Regarding Review En Banc, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. June
26, 2018).
151. Letter from Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor Gen., to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Supreme Court
Clerk, Regarding Sessions v. City of Chicago (June 27, 2018). This issue was resolved in Order to
vacate the decision to rehear No. 17-2991 en banc, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991 (7th
Cir. Aug, 10, 2018).
152. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018).
153. Id.
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decision as a better method of going back before the Justices to either
eliminate such injunctions or at least limit their use. In the meantime, we
are going to see more of these, like the recent decision issued from a
federal district judge in Houston, Texas on deportation of parents
separated from their children under President Trump’s short lived “zerotolerance” policy,154 and the one issued by U.S. District Judge Robert
Lasnik of Seattle granting the request for a nationwide temporary
restraining order sought by eight Democratic state attorneys general to
block an Austin company from publishing blueprints for a 3D-printed
gun, as mandated by a settlement between the company and the U.S. State
Department.155 Even more recently, Federal District Judge Jon Tigar
issued a nationwide injunction on November 19, 2018, that temporarily
barred the Trump administration from requiring that all asylum
applications be made at official ports of entry. 156 This has blown up into
a spat between President Trump and Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Roberts over whether there is such a thing as an “Obama judge”
(President Trump’s words) or only “an extraordinary group of dedicated
judges doing their level best.” (I will let you guess who said that.)157
Though the Department of Justice is making clear in public speeches that
it “believe[s] that the Supreme Court should issue a clear ruling that
shows that district judges cannot issue nationwide injunctions,” 158 the
Court is not yet listening (perhaps in response to Justice Roberts public
defense of the Court as nonpartisan). Rather than using the asylum case
as a vehicle to determine the constitutionality of such nationwide
injunctions, the Court, split 5-4, denied a stay of the asylum ban
injunction.159

154. Mark Curriden, Houston Chief Federal Judge Issues First TRO in Parent Deportation,
TEX. LAWBOOK (July 12, 2018), https://texaslawbook.net/houston-chief-federal-judge-issues-firsttro-in-parent-deportation/.
155. Chuck Lindell, Judge Extends Order Blocking 3D-Printed Gun Plans, STATESMAN (Sept.
26, 2018, 12:16 PM), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/20180827/Judge-extends-orderblocking-3D-printed-gun-plans.
156. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
157. Greg Stohr, Trump Escalates His Feud with Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Roberts over ‘Obama Judges’ Rebuke, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2018, 11:14 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-roberts-obama-judge-courts20181122-story.html.
158. Matthew Whitaker, Acting Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on the
Importance of a Lawful Immigration System in Austin, Texas (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-attorney-general-matthew-whitaker-delivers-remarksimportance-lawful-immigration.
159. Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782, 782 (2018) (mem.) (denying
application for stay by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts.
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would grant the application for stay).
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CONCLUSION
The Chicago Seven trial was “political” by almost any definition. We
may not see more overtly political cases (unless our Statue of Liberty
climber or some other anti-Trump groups wants to take on that role). The
spectacle of a black man bound and gagged in America in the 1960s is
hard to bare. Some new scholars argue that we can turn all crimes into
“political” ones through the activity of courtwatching by otherwise
marginalized community members. While I am not convinced that this
movement will expand into this role, I ultimately do not believe that
federal district judges will gain or lose discretion over their courtrooms
in this manner. Judicial behavior will be checked, and any modern-day
symbol of Mr. Seale shackled will be curbed by the simple fact of modern
technology. Cameras and other devices will become so ubiquitous that
the American public will watch judges at all times. This will curb judges
from exhibiting frustrations with those before them.
So, while judges will remain as seemingly impartial as they have been
over the last fifty years, this is not to say that the world of judges has not
changed. Federal district judges lost most of their discretion over criminal
sentencing in the mid-1980s, and they are only, over the last decade,
beginning to exercise it again. It is true that our particular de facto
administrative law system of resolving all criminal matters through plea
bargaining initially shifted all authority in this process to federal
prosecutors.160 However, since the FSG are now advisory,161 and since
most plea bargains are accepted under the subsections of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 that permits federal judges to determine the
sentence and/or reject the bargain entirely,162 judges have pulled back
some of their sentencing authority. The current system leaves judges free
to impose any sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum
penalty, completely ignoring the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (after
correctly calculating the appropriate range).163
Finally, I have noted one area where a few federal district judges have
increased their authority, though this is not a phenomenon that directly
concerns the criminal justice system. Federal judges can stop the
application of a statute, regulation, or executive order not just as against
160. See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
161. USSC BOOKER REPORT, supra note 116, at 10 (noting that post-Booker the FSG are
considered guidelines but nevertheless remain critically important, citing FRCP 11, and noting that
judges can theoretically still reject some plea bargains).
162. See supra note 112.
163. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 115 (2007) (district judge must
correctly calculate sentence pursuant to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but appellate court will
uphold any reasonable sentence outside that range).
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a particular plaintiff, but on a nationwide basis. If this power were to
spread to declaratory relief, it might give a single unelected federal
official a chokehold over executive and legislative policy.

